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Abstract: 
It is now stylized that, while the impact of ownership on firm productivity is unclear, product 
market competition can be expected to have a positive impact on productivity, thereby making 
entry (or contestability of markets) desirable. Traditional research in the context of entry has 
explored the strategic reactions of incumbent firms when threatened by the possibility of entry. 
However, following De Soto (1989), there has been increasing emphasis on regulatory and 
institutional factors governing entry rates, especially in the context of developing countries. 
Using 3-digit industry level data from India, for the 1984-97 period, we examine the 
phenomenon of entry in the Indian context. Our empirical results suggest that during the 1980s 
industry level factors largely explained variations in entry rates, but that, following the economic 
federalism brought about by the post-1991 reforms, variations entry rates during the 1990s were 
explained largely by state level institutional and legacy factors. We also find evidence to suggest 
that, in India, entry rates were positively associated with growth in total factor productivity. 
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1. Introduction 
Private ownership of productive resources and competition are often considered to be 
the key determinants of total factor productivity and this, in turn, influences financial 
and operating performance of firms. However, evidence on the relationship between 
ownership and firm performance is mixed. Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) 
and D’Souza and Megginson (1999), for example, have found strong evidence of an 
improvement in financial and operating performance of firms subsequent to being 
privatized. On the other hand, in a number of contexts, this relationship turns out to be 
either weak or not evident at all (e.g., Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik, 1998; Estrin and 
Rosevear, 1999; Demsetz and Villalogna, 2001). This is largely due to agency conflicts 
among the various stakeholders of the privately owned (in some cases, newly 
privatized) firms. In the context of the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and, of developing countries in other parts of the world, some of these agency 
conflicts may arise on account of paucity of appropriate institutions, e.g., a legal 
framework that allows enforcement of contracts at a reasonably low cost. 
 
The failure of private ownership to emerge as a panacea for low productivity in 
particular and, bad firm performance in general, has brought the focus firmly back on 
competition. Nickell (1996) argued that competition does indeed enhance firm 
performance, and Pilat (1996) concluded that there is a positive relationship between 
productivity in OECD countries and the extent to which their manufacturing firms face 
domestic and international competition. The link between competition and productivity 
growth, or even firm performance, is not necessarily universal, though. Blanchflower 
and Machin (1996), for example, concluded that the impact of competition on 
productivity might be context specific; competition raised productivity in Australia but 
failed to do so in the United Kingdom. However, it is now fairly stylized that 
competition is a desirable characteristic of a market because it encourages innovation 
and leads to improvement in the both the production and x- efficiencies of an average 
firm in an industry (Geroski, 1995; Stennek, 2000). 
 
It is generally accepted that the degree of competition in a market is directly 
proportional to its contestability, i.e., on the ease with which new firms can enter the 
market to compete with the incumbent firms. Even though the new entrants may 
themselves be very heterogeneous with respect to productivity and efficiency (e.g., Aw,  
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Chen and Roberts, 2001), the more efficient of these entrants induce the incumbent 
firms to innovate so as to enhance or, at the very least retain high levels of productivity 
and efficiency. As such, innovation is greater in competitive markets than in non-
competitive markets (Jovanovic and Lach, 1989). The firms that are unable to increase 
their efficiency levels through innovation, or are unable to retain high initial levels of 
efficiency, are forced to leave the market (Liu, 1993), thereby raising the average plant 
or firm level productivity (or efficiency) of the industry. Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) 
found that entry accounted for about 24 per cent of productivity growth in a typical 
Canadian industry. 
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the process of entry and exit and the barriers thereof have 
attracted a fair amount of attention. The early literature focussed on industry 
characteristics like the growth of profit or turnover, and on the strategic aspects of the 
behavior of the incumbents who have an obvious incentive to keep potential 
competitors out of the market. However, as highlighted by Geroski (1995), it has proved 
difficult to explain entry rates using conventional measures of profitability (of 
incumbent firms) and entry barriers. This led to rethinking about the drivers of entry, 
and the path-breaking study by De Soto (1989) brought to the fore the fact that 
institutional factors might explain net entry rates much better than industry-level and 
strategic factors, especially in the context of developing economies. This has triggered a 
literature that aims to identify the nature of impact of institutional factors on entry rates. 
 
However, to the extent that we are interested in “entry” as a manifested outcome of 
liberal economic policies, one that subsequently has an impact on growth of 
productivity, its connotation may depend significantly on the context in which it is 
discussed. For a mature market economy where the observed output levels, input-output 
mix etc of the incumbent firms are an outcome of their optimization exercises, the status 
quo can change, leading to greater competition, only if new firms enter, or credibly 
threaten to enter. In a controlled economy, however, a variety of factors prevent 
incumbent firms themselves to operate an at output level, or with input-output mixes 
that are optimal. For example, prior to the 1990s, the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade 
Practices (MRTP) Act in India prevented incumbent firms from increasing productive 
capacity beyond a certain size, even if the long run optimal level of output of these 
firms lay beyond this threshold size. In such a context, adoption of liberal economic  
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policies may lead to greater competition by way of changes in the output levels and 
input-output mix of the incumbent firms themselves, even if new firms per se do not 
enter the product market. Indeed, in the context of a large country with significant inter-
regional differences, cross-regional “entry” rates may also reflect relocation of 
industrial units from regions of mis-governance to regions that are better governed.  
 
In a developing country, therefore, we can view “entry” as a phenomenon involving not 
only entry of a new firm with one or more new production units, but also the process of 
expansion of incumbent firms by way of establishment of additional production units.
1 
In addition, in such a country, where local conditions and institutions might vary 
significantly across regions, “entry” as a phenomenon may have a spatial dimension. 
We will address these issues in more detail later in this paper, in the context of a 
discussion about the data and the empirical strategy adopted for our analysis. 
 
In this paper, we use 3-digit industry level data from India, a developing economy that 
has experienced significant economic reforms since the mid 1980s, to explain inter-
industry and spatial variation in entry. We then examine the possible impact of entry on 
growth of total factor productivity (tfp) in the manufacturing sector. Our results suggest 
that during the 1980s, entry was influenced mostly by industry-level factors like growth. 
By contrast, in the 1990s, state level factors like availability of skilled labor and 
accountability of the state government to the electorate emerged as the most important 
determinants of net entry rates. In addition, variations in entry across industries and 
states in the post-1991 period were largely explained by unobserved state-level factors, 
thereby highlighting the importance of institutional factors and governance in an era of 
economic federalism. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that entry and tfp growth in 
the Indian manufacturing sector are positively correlated. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we briefly discuss the 
literature on the determinants of entry and exit. The regulatory and institutional aspects 
of India are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we develop the empirical specification 
that is used for the subsequent analysis. The data are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
                                                 
1 By the same token, “exit” would comprise not only closure of entire firms, but also of some 
productive units of some of the firms.  
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reports the regression results. The relationship between (net) entry and tfp is explored in 
Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. A brief survey of literature 
The theoretical literature on the determinants of entry rates largely addresses the 
question as to how incumbent firms react to entry and threats of entry. Eaton and Lipsey 
(1980), for example, argue that if capital is product specific and has to be replaced after 
a finite time period then an incumbent firm would be forced to take into consideration 
the threat of entry. This is easily explained: Suppose that the incumbent firm is a natural 
monopolist that has to replace product-specific capital every T years. During the T
th 
year, however, a new firm can buy the product-specific capital just a little ahead of the 
incumbent firm and become the monopolist for the next T years. A rational incumbent 
would know this, and would therefore try to pre-empt the entrant by replacing the 
capital during year T-i. But then a rational entrant would know this, and would, in turn, 
try to pre-empt the incumbent by buying the capital in year T-j, where j is greater than i. 
Hence, the incumbent firm would be forced to think of alternative strategies to keep the 
potential entrant out of the market in each time period t. The incentive of the incumbent 
firm to deter entry would be even greater if, as argued by Seabright (1996), entry by one 
firm facilitates the entry of many others by reducing the ability of the incumbent to 
produce at a low cost. 
 
It is evident that in Eaton and Lipsey’s framework, the problem for the incumbent firm 
is posed by an implicit assumption that when the potential entrant threatens to enter the 
market, the incumbent facing lower returns on its investment cannot simply bail out by 
selling its capital to the entrant. In other words, the problem does not lie in either the 
product-specificity of the capital or the economies of scale associated with natural 
monopoly; the threat of entry poses a problem for the incumbent only when the 
investment is sunk. This is consistent with the view of Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1982) – the first serious critique of Bain’s (1956) postulate that existence of economies 
of scale in an industry deters entry
2 – and finds support in the research of Macleod 
(1989).
3
 
                                                 
2  The inadequacy of scale economies in explaining entry can also be extended to a weak 
relationship between scale economies and exit by small firms that cannot attain the necessary  
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It is easy to see that if production in a market involves sunk costs, a strategic option 
facing an incumbent firm is to raise the extent of sunk costs faced by a potential entrant 
should it decide to enter the market. This led Dixit (1980) to argue that incumbent firms 
would invest in capacities that are beyond what is optimal in the context of a non-
contestable market to deter entry.
4 It has also been argued that marketing tools like 
extensive advertising might be used by incumbent firms to increase the sunk cost faced 
by entering firms (Schmalensee, 1978; Geroski and Murfin, 1991). 
 
It is easily seen that the effectiveness of this form of (strategic) entry barrier would 
increase with the difficulty with which a potential entrant can find financial resources 
necessary to incur the sunk cost associated with entry. Indeed, even if we do not take at 
face value Bain’s (1956) argument that capital requirements would pose a barrier for 
potential entrants, and adopt Stigler’s (1968) view that a potential entrant faces a barrier 
to entry only if it has to incur a cost that an incumbent does not have to face, access to 
financial resources might prove to be an important consideration in the context of entry. 
We need make only the reasonable assumption that a new firm aiming to enter a market 
would face a substantially higher cost of capital than an incumbent firm with a proven 
track record. Indeed, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) have argued that liquidity constraints 
bind such that wealthier people are more likely to become entrepreneurs than their 
poorer counterparts. 
 
Finally, the literature has concluded that incumbent firms can use long-term contracts 
with both suppliers of input and consumers to deter entry. Chicago economists have 
suggested that it would necessarily be more profitable for incumbent firms to supply to 
new entrants inputs over which they (jointly) have monopoly control by way of such 
contracts, rather than refusing supply to these competitors. However, Bolton and 
Whinston (1991, 1993) and Hart and Tirole (1990) have conclusively demonstrated that 
                                                                                                                                               
minimum scale. Clarke (1984) has shown that scale economies have to be quite high to drive 
small firms out of the market. 
3 Dewatripont (1988) has argued that while increasing sunk cost might deter new firms from 
entering the market, in the presence of trade unions, the labor force would gain bargaining 
power if entry is deterred. Hence, an incumbent firm would have to balance the gains from entry 
deterrence with the losses arising out of greater bargaining power of the labor force. 
4 Spulber (1981) argued that the use of excess capacity to deter entry is inconsistent with post-
entry Cournot-Nash behavior, and can therefore be observed only when the incumbent firm is a 
Stackelberg leader.  
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under certain conditions rationing or refusing supply to the new entrants would be both 
rational and credible. On the other end of the spectrum, Aghion and Bolton (1987) 
argued that incumbent firms would enter into long term contracts involving penalty 
clauses with consumers to prevent entry of low cost firms. Rasmusen, Ramseyer and 
Wiley (1991) showed that it is plausible for incumbent firms to exploit coordination 
failure among (numerous) consumers to enter into such contracts. 
 
The early empirical literature on determinants of entry viewed industry characteristics 
as the drivers of entry and exit rates. In an oft cited study, Tybout (1997), for example, 
used real output growth, industry concentration as measured by the Herfinadhl index, 
import penetration rate, and capital-output ratio as the determinants of industry-level 
entry and exit rates in Chile.
5 His results indicated that, during 1979-86, entry and exit 
rates in Chile were influenced positively by growth of real output and negatively by 
industry concentration ratio, the latter being a measure of the power of the dominant 
incumbent firms. 
 
In one of the first studies of its kind, Djankov et al. (2002) used data from 85 countries 
to explore the impact of institutions on entry rates. Their data, which was evidently 
influenced by De Soto’s thesis, included measures of the number of procedures that a 
firm has to follow to get registered for business, as well as other factors that might 
influence the time cost of doing business legally. Their results indicate that the cost of 
entry is fairly high in most countries, particularly in the countries that are not within the 
upper quartile of income distribution. They also find that countries that do not have 
democratic governments tend to regulate entry more heavily, an observation that is 
consistent with the public choice view that governments that are not accountable to the 
people of a country are more likely to use regulatory barriers as a means to seeking rent 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
 
This line of argument also finds support in the research of Perotti and Volpin (2004) and 
Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2005). Perotti and Volpin argue that if wealth distribution 
is unequal then incumbent firms are able to prevent entry by way of lobbying the 
politicians for entry-deterrent regulations. They succeed in their effort to influence the 
                                                 
5  In addition, the empirical exercise controlled for unobserved industry- and year-specific 
factors using dummy variables.  
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decisions of the politicians because they can promise greater rent than potential entrants 
who can only hope to earn normal profits in a competitive industry. Entry increases 
when wealth distribution becomes less unequal and when the accountability of the 
politicians increases. Their empirical analysis, which involves data from 38 countries 
and 33 industries for the 1983-92 period indicates that, entry in sectors that require 
greater external capital increases with accountability.  
 
Klapper et al., who use a comprehensive database of European firms, find that entry is 
low if the cost of entry is increased on account of regulatory factors, even if an industry 
is naturally a “high entry” industry.
6 Regulations remain an important determinant of 
entry rates even after the empirical analysis controls for factors like availability of 
financial resources and protection of intellectual property rights. Regulatory barriers 
particularly discriminate against smaller firms. However, the empirical analysis also 
suggests that entry rates are adversely affected by capital market imperfections, and that 
protection of property rights has a positive impact on these rates. 
 
In sum, the empirical literature has concluded that while some industry characteristics 
like growth of output and industry concentration influence entry rates, institutional 
factors play an important role in determining entry. In particular, bureaucratic or 
regulatory barriers, which might themselves be influenced strategically by incumbent 
firms, have a significant and detrimental impact on entry rates. In addition, entry rates 
are affected by factors like access to capital and protection of property rights. While 
they provide a significant insight into the dynamics of entry, they suffer from the same 
shortcoming that afflicts all cross-country studies.  
 
With some exceptions (e.g., Botero et al., 2004), detailed data capturing the exact nature 
of cross-country variation in institutions are typically unavailable. As a consequence, 
cross-country studies rely on the use of broad-brush controls like “democracy” or “legal 
origin” or “protection of property rights” that are themselves fairly heterogeneous. The 
Klapper et al. (2005) methodology goes a long way in addressing some of the problems 
associated with cross-country studies, but still does not account for divergence between 
de jure and de facto implementation of regulations that may be quite significant in 
                                                 
6 An industry is defined as “high entry” if it experiences high entry rates in the United States of 
America, the comparator.  
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developing countries. One possible way to address this lacuna in the literature is to 
analyse entry rates at the sub-national level where the letter of the law is necessarily the 
same everywhere but where implementation might vary widely across regions. As noted 
earlier, we adopt this approach to an analysis of entry rates in this paper. 
 
3. Reforms and industrial policy in India 
The popular wisdom about India’s reforms process is that it was initiated in 1991, in the 
aftermath of a severe balance of payments crisis. However, two recent papers (Rodrik 
and Subramanian, 2005; Virmani, 2004) argue that the structural change in India was 
more pronounced in the 1980s than in the 1990s. Using aggregate data for the Indian 
economy, they make the case that the data for the 1990s do not support the hypothesis 
that the reform process that started in 1991, and has been carried out since then, has 
resulted in a sharp break from the past. Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) go on to 
suggest that the decade of the 1980s was characterised by a pro-incumbent business 
policy while the 1990s was a more pro-entrant policy. 
 
The pro-incumbent nature of the policy regime of the 1980s was evident in a number of 
policy initiatives. The industrial policy resolution of 1980 emphasized the need for 
improving productivity in existing units in order to make them globally competitive. 
The role of scale economies in the private sector, both in terms of new technologies and 
cost-effective organizational structures, was recognized for the first time since 
Independence. In keeping with the new vision of industrial development, in 1980, a 
business house was redefined as one whose combined assets exceeded INR 1 billion, 
i.e., five times the limit of INR 200 million set in 1973. This meant that all firms with 
assets between INR 200 million and 1 billion could operate in sectors in which they 
were not allowed entry prior to 1980. Second, business houses were allowed to operate 
outside their permitted list of sectors if they set up factories in economically backward 
areas. Third, existing units could set up new units, without restriction on size, provided 
the latter were 100 per cent export oriented. Fourth, access to foreign technology, 
hitherto severely restricted, was allowed if it resulted in either export growth or 
significant improvement in cost structures of the firms. Fifth, the upper limit for capital 
stock used for defining the small scale sector was increased from INR 1 to 2 million. 
(The limit for ancillary units was increased to INR 2.5 million from the earlier 1.5 
million.)   
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In addition to such industrial policies, a fiscal policy initiative was introduced in the 
mid-1980s to encourage firms to undertake long-term investment plans. Duties on 
project related imports were reduced, along with those on all other capital goods. At the 
same time, import duties on final goods continued to be high. While all these were 
favourable to existing companies, status quo was maintained with respect to the 
licensing procedure for most new entrants. In other words, incumbent firms were able to 
reduce cost of production and, at the same time, extract rent in markets that were 
protected from import competition. Further, while both incumbent and new firms 
required licenses for capacity expansion and production, respectively, the former were 
at an advantage on account of their continuing relationship with the government 
bureaucracy. As a consequence, the licensing process (and the playing field, in general) 
was heavily loaded in favour of incumbents (Bhagwati, 1982, 1988).  
 
In the early 1980s, some sectors were delicensed, and this process was slightly modified 
in the mid-1980s. However, a more important initiative was that of broad-banding. 
Originally, a license was given for a specific product. This meant that a producer of 
two-wheelers, for example, who had a license for scooters, could not produce motor-
cycles, without seeking a licence. However, with broad-banding, expansion of business 
into related areas became possible. This, once again, gave a boost to product 
development as well as economies of scope and scale. However, with the licensing 
requirement for new entrants still in place, broad-banding gave a clear advantage to the 
incumbent firms. 
 
An important new law was enacted in the second half of the 1980s: the Sick Industrial 
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, or SICA, of 1985. Under this Act, a bankruptcy 
court, named the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), was set up 
in 1987. Under the SICA, any company that has been registered for more than 7 years 
and whose net worth has turned negative must apply to BIFR for permission for closure. 
There are three important aspects to this law. First, small units were kept outside the 
purview of the law. Second, the application was mandatory and not voluntary as in the 
US Chapter 11 bankruptcy code. Third, since application to BIFR was mandatory, 
creditors could not attach and liquidate assets of the defaulting companies. According to 
the Act, closure of an industrial unit was considered to be a social loss and, hence, this 
outcome was to be avoided wherever possible. In order to facilitate the operation of  
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these sick (financially distressed) industrial units, credit was provided by government 
owned banks and financial institutions at subsidized interest rates. Further, and not 
surprisingly, all capacity and licensing restrictions were suspended if a healthy company 
merged with a sick one under the supervision of BIFR. Since the managers did not face 
any cost of bankruptcy, there were strong incentives to overlook impending financial 
distress (Gangopadhyay and Knopf, 1998), and facilitated the creation of non-
performing assets on the balance sheets of the banks (Bhaumik and Mukherjee, 2002). 
Once again, it skewed the playing field against potential entrants; capital was tied up in 
loss-making industrial units instead of being delivered to new units of production. 
 
By contrast, the post-1991 reforms laid strong emphases on enabling markets and 
globalization coupled with lower degrees of direct government involvement in 
economic activities. The focus was mainly on five areas: foreign investment, entry 
procedures, technology, monopolies and restrictive trade practices (MRTP Act), and the 
public sector. Quite significantly, the first policy announcement of the reform process 
was the abolition of licenses. For the first time in post-Independence India, licensing 
requirements for all projects were abolished; only those related to defence or potentially 
environment-damaging industries needed prior permission.
7 As of 1991, an entrepreneur 
only has to file an information memorandum on new projects and/or for substantial 
capacity expansions. Further, the MRTP Act was amended such that the need for 
approval from the central government for establishing a new plant, capacity expansion, 
merger, takeover and directors’ appointments (in the private sector) was abolished. 
 
The 1990s’ reforms also encouraged technology adoption and greater participation of 
foreign companies in the Indian industrial sector. Until 1991, foreign ownership of 
equity was restricted to less than 40 per cent in all sectors, and FDI was completely 
disallowed in many of these sectors. In 1991, foreign direct investment up to 51 per cent 
equity was allowed in some of the sectors, and, over the next fourteen years, there has 
been a significant relaxation of the rules governing FDI across the board (see Beena et 
al., 2004). By the end of the 1990s, most manufacturing units in the SEZs were allowed 
100 per cent FDI under automatic approval.
8 Further, the “dividend balancing” 
                                                 
7 By the end of 1997-98, all but 9 industries had been delicensed. 
8 The following items were excluded: arms and ammunition, explosives and allied items of 
defence equipment, defence aircraft and warships; atomic substances; narcotics and  
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requirement on 22 consumer goods industry was removed.
9 Procedures for the 
procurement of technology from abroad were also simplified, largely by way of 
facilitation of ways for payment of patent-related royalties. The high priority industries 
were given automatic permission for technology transfer.  
 
The 1990s also witnessed the operationalisation of the long-debated policy initiatives on 
the role of the public sector within the country’s industrial structure. Until the end of the 
1980s, prices of most infrastructure and basic intermediates were controlled by the 
government on a cost-plus basis, under the aegis of the administered price regime 
(APR). This led to allocative inefficiencies and, at the same time, created conditions of 
supply shortages, as administered prices typically failed to clear the market. In the 
context of these supply shortages, it was easier for incumbent companies with existing 
supply chains and government contacts to procure the rationed supply of intermediate 
products. In the 1990s, the APR was abandoned, and the list of industries reserved for 
the public sector was reduced from 17 to 8. In 1993-94, the list of sectors reserved for 
the public sector was further reduced to 6. State monopolies in insurance, civil aviation, 
telecommunication and petroleum were abandoned, and the private sector was allowed 
participation in these sectors. In effect, entry barriers for the Indian industrial sector had 
been further removed. 
 
It is evident that while changes to industrial policies were afoot since the 1980s, the 
reforms of the 1990s were more favourable to entrepreneurship development, and hence 
entry, compared to the 1980s. While both sets of reforms were more pro-industry 
compared to what has been happening since Independence, the 1980s’ reforms were 
directed more at increasing the profitability of existing companies without reducing the 
barriers to entry faced by potential entrants. The obvious question to ask, therefore, is 
how the two different policy regimes impacted the actual entry and investment 
decisions of companies during the two decades. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
psychotropic substances and hazardous chemicals; distillation and brewing of alcoholic drinks; 
and cigarettes/cigars and manufactured tobacco substitutes. 
9 Dividend balancing required that a foreign investor plough back its dividends and/or royalty 
from an Indian operation into the same operation for a stipulated number of years.  
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Since the purpose of licensing was to achieve macro-balance and targets set by the 5-
year Plans, these permissions were handed out by the central government and not by the 
state governments. Indeed, the Centre exercised complete control over industries prior 
to the 1990s in a number of other ways. For example, foreign exchange and its control 
was a prerogative of the central government and all foreign currency transactions were 
closely monitored and severely restricted through the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
(FERA). One major implication of the reforms carried out in the 1990s was that the 
control of the central government over the process and pattern of industrialization 
waned and, at the same time, states started playing a much larger role in their own 
industrialization. While the central government continued to have control over 
environmental policies, labour policies, and bankruptcy procedures, the implementation 
of the associated laws and regulations was passed on to the states, thereby according the 
states significant discretionary powers over the industrial sector. Hence, in addition to 
the characterization of the 1980s as pro-incumbent and the 1990s as pro-entrant, we will 
also have to take into account the impact of the greater federalism in industrial decisions 
in the 1990s. 
 
An important aspect of this federalism in economic policy is the competition among 
different policy approaches. In a centralized economic system, there is very little scope 
for competitive experiments in policy. The only competition faced by a centrally 
controlled policy regime is from the approaches followed by other nations. In the case 
of India, this would have come from Japan and the Gang of Four in the early stages and 
from the Asian tigers in more recent years. However, if a country follows an explicit 
import substitution strategy, and is not keen to entice FDI, much of the discussion about 
inter-country competition within the policy space is moot. But if the policy regime 
within a country is federal in nature, states acting within the same macro-spectrum 
could operate very differently. There is prima facie evidence to suggest that, in post-
1991 India, there was inter-state variation in the degree of accountability of the state 
governments (Besley and Burgess, 2004). As we shall argue later, political 
accountability may have different impact on industrialization and hence on entry of 
industrial units under different circumstances.  
 
However, economic federalism has also exposed states to vulnerabilities that owe their 
origin to inter-state differences in endowments of resources. To the extent that firms  
  13
require both general resources like skilled or semi-skilled labor, or product-specific 
resources like established supply chains, some states are at an advantage over others in 
the context of entry of new production units. The persistence of investment of a certain 
type in a certain region is regularly observed at the international level: China is clearly 
more likely than India to attract a new investment in low cost mass manufacturing 
industries.  
 
In the next section, we develop an analytical paradigm that allows us to take on board 
both industry level and state level factors that may have influenced entry rates of 
industrial production units in India between 1985 and 1997.  
 
4. Empirics of entry 
Two things are evident from the above literature: First, even though industry level 
factors may have affected entry rates in the Indian industrial sector in both the 1980s 
and the 1990s, the specific industry level factors affecting growth during the pre- and 
post-1991 periods may have been significantly different. Second, as argued by Kochhar 
et al. (forthcoming), the economic federalism in India that emerged in the post-1991 era 
suggests that we can expect institutional factors to play a greater role in determining 
state level growth/performance in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Bhaumik, Gangopadhyay 
and Krishnan (2005) have extended this line of argument to propose that the same 
would hold true for performance of manufacturing units, a hypothesis that has found 
support in the analysis of cross-sectional variation in the pre- and post-1991 plant level 
labor productivity. Aghion et al. (2005) have reached similar conclusions using long 
panels. Further, there is evidence about post-1991 differences in the ability of states to 
translate economic growth into poverty reduction (Datt and Ravallion, 1998), largely on 
account of differences in factors like human resources. It is reasonable to presume that 
some of the factors that affect economic conditions like poverty might also affect choice 
of location of manufacturing units. It is evident, therefore, that in addition to industry 
level factors, state level factors are also likely to affect entry rates. 
 
In order to capture these two dimensions of the entry dynamics witnessed in India in the 
1980s and the 1990s, we think of entry rate in India being characterized by indices i and 
j where i refers to the industrial sectors and j refers to the states. Assuming that there are  
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m industry level factors (Xm) and n state level factors (Zn) that affect entry rates (Y), we, 
therefore, propose to estimate the following model: 
 
e Z X Y ij ij
n j
j
m i
ij i ij + + + = ∑ ∑
= = γ β α    [1] 
 
This aspect of our methodology is similar to the approach of Klapper et al. (2005); each 
of their observations is indexed by industry j and country k. However, as we shall 
explain later in the paper, our empirical strategy differs from that of Klapper et al. in an 
important way. 
 
Following Tybout (1997), and the literature discussed earlier in the paper, entry rates 
are influenced by the following industry characteristics: 
 
Growth of the industry: Not surprisingly, entry is likely to be higher for fast growing 
industries than for their stagnant counterparts. Indeed, net entry might actually be 
negative for industries that are either not growing or are experiencing negative growth. 
 
Technology: If an industry has an old technology, the advantage lies with incumbent 
firms because the currency of competition in such industries is not innovation but 
factors like economies of scale. However, if the competitive edge in an industry is 
incumbent on access to technology and associated innovation, it is possible for new 
firms to leapfrog incumbent firms in terms of productivity and efficiency, thereby 
making the industry more open to new entry. 
 
Industry concentration: If an industry is concentrated, such that a handful of incumbent 
firms account for a disproportionately large share of the output, these firms are in a 
position to earn supernormal profits, and hence have a lot to lose if entry makes the 
market more competitive. Incumbents in concentrated markets, therefore, are likely to 
lobby the governments and use other strategic measures to prevent entry as much as 
possible. Chari and Gupta (2005), for example, have found evidence in the Indian 
context that suggest that regulations that raise entry barriers for foreign firms are more 
likely to be found for industries that are highly concentrated. 
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Number of incumbent firms: Even if a market is not concentrated, such that an 
individual incumbent firm does not have the capability to deter entry to a significant 
extent, the total number of incumbent firms is likely to influence entry rates in 
developing countries where resources are relatively scarce and where existing resources 
may be contractually tied to the incumbent firms. Indeed, some resources like able 
managerial labor may be organizationally embedded in incumbent firms in the form of 
the owner-managers of these firms. Hence, in developing country contexts, entry rate 
for an industry is likely to be negatively related with the number of incumbent firms in 
the industry. 
 
It is more difficult to decide on the state level factors that may affect entry rates, largely 
because the economic factors are usually highly correlated with each other, as also with 
political or institutional characterizations of the states. However, on the basis of the 
“institutional” literature discussed earlier in this paper, we account for the following 
state level factors: 
 
Economic growth: It is stylized that GDP growth rate is strongly correlated with firm 
entry and foreign direct investment at the national or country level. By the same token, 
growth of state domestic product, the state level equivalent of the GDP, should have an 
impact of entry, with higher growth being associated with higher entry rates. 
 
Nature of democracy: Cross country studies (e.g., Djankov et al., 2002) have suggested 
that factors like democracy can play a role in determining entry rates. While the legal 
and constitutional aspects of democracy would be the same across India, the federal 
nature of the democracy implies that the nature of democracy, i.e., the relationship 
between the government and other stakeholders at the state level may vary considerably 
across the country. In particular, regional political parties, whose collective political 
fortune has been on the rise since the late 1980s, and who have come to dominate the 
political landscape in India since the 1990s, may behave very differently from national 
political parties whose political fortunes are more diversified across states than those of 
the former.  
 
Further, precisely because democracy reduces the ability of special interest groups to 
influence the economic agenda of a government, and given the fact that in India the  
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livelihood of nearly two-thirds of the people continue to be associated with agricultural 
activities, with formal sector employment accounting for less than 5 per cent of the 
labor force, it is not obvious as to whether democracy at the state level in India would 
necessarily favor entry into and expansion of the industrial sector. In other words, the 
impact of state level democracy on entry in India is an open empirical question. 
 
Labor: Industrial development in India responded to the policy emphasis on tertiary 
education and the development of a capital goods sector, employment protection in the 
formal sector, and financial repression in the pre-1991 era by channelling the 
manufacturing sector into skill-intensive industries (see, e.g., Bhagwati and Desai, 
1970; Joshi and Little, 1994). This trend has continued beyond 1991, the additional 
twist being the rise and the growth of the skill-intensive industries (Kochhar et al., 
2005). Hence, at least in the post-1991 period, spatial differences in entry rates should, 
in principle, find an explanation in state level differences in the availability of skilled 
labor.  
 
Following Botero et al. (2004) and Besley and Burgess (2004), entry rates would also 
depend on factors like labor regulations. Once again, while labor laws are largely 
uniform across India, there is considerable variation across states in the bargaining 
power of labor(ers) vis-à-vis the industrial units and their management. In states like 
Kerala and West Bengal, in which the Indian communist parties are on a strong footing, 
a significant proportion of formal sector laborers are unionized and often have the tacit 
support of the state administration when they bargain for wages and benefits with the 
aforementioned management. The currency for bargaining is usually industrial action. 
The degree of unionization of laborers is much less in some of the other states, and 
some state governments are viewed as being pro-industry, as opposed to being pro-
labor. Ceteris paribus, we can expect lower entry rates in states where laborers have 
relatively greater bargaining power, with or without explicit political support of the state 
governments. 
 
Legacy: The economic geography literature has long held that industries can enjoy 
significant agglomeration economies if they locate production units in geographical 
locations (e.g., Hoover, 1948). One implication of the presence of such economies is 
that certain locations within large countries attract much of the manufacturing  
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production units, while other regions remain largely agricultural (Krugman, 1991). 
Hence, in the Indian context, a priori states like Gujarat and Maharashtra, which have 
had a strong manufacturing core can be expected to witness more entry relative to other 
states.  
 
In sum, and in keeping with the notation introduced earlier in this section, the vector X 
includes the following industry level factors: a proxy of industry level growth, the 
nature of technology used for production, the degree of concentration of the industry, 
the initial number of production units, and a proxy of the minimum efficient scale that, 
in turn, determines the extent of a new entrant’s required financial commitment. On the 
other hand, the vector Z includes the following state level factors: economic growth, a 
proxy of the nature of democracy at the state level, a proxy of the quality of available 
labor, a proxy of the bargaining power of the labor force, and a measure of the initial 
degree of industrialization at the state level. We discuss the exact measures of these 
variables in the next section. 
 
5. Data 
We restrict our analysis to the 1984-97 period. The years prior to 1984 were marked by 
war (1971), oil price shock, political crisis (1974-80), industrial strife (1982-83), 
insurgency in northern India (1980-84), and the assassination of Indira Gandhi (1984). 
Post-1997 data, on the other hand, is incompatible with the pre-1997 data because of 
several changes in the format in which ASI collects plant-level information. However, 
the 1984-97 period captures the entire time frame of the Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2005) analysis, and was largely stable politically. It, therefore, allows us to undertake a 
meaningful analysis of entry while, at the same time, contrasting the determinants of net 
entry in the pre- and post-1991 periods. Specifically, we contrast the determinants of net 
entry in the 1984-91 period with those in the 1992-97 period. 
 
The source of our data and the measurement of the variables are described below: 
 
5.1 Net entry 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, we use primarily state-level 3-digit industry data 
from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). In the context of the spatial dimension of 
entry, we consider 15 states (out of the possible 32 during the period covered by the  
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data presented here).
10 There are many reasons for restricting ourselves to these states. 
First, these states have existed for the entire period of the data without any change in 
their geographical area or administrative setup. For example, among the states that have 
been left out, there are many that have moved from being centrally administered to ones 
where they elect their own state-level governments. Second, around 95 percent of the 
Indian population resides in these states. Third, more than 90 percent of all factories are 
located in these 15 states. Indeed, in many of the states that are left out of our sample, 
industrialization is a very recent phenomenon and, therefore, the methodology for 
collecting data in these states is not the same as in the states we are studying. The data 
collection methodology for the 15 states included in our sample has remained largely 
the same throughout our period of analysis. 
 
The ASI defines factories to be all productive units that employ l0 or more laborers and 
use power, as well as those that do not use power but employ 20 or more laborers. They 
also include bidi and cigar-manufacturing establishments registered under the Bidi and 
Cigar Workers Act 1966, i.e., once again, employing l0 or more workers if using power, 
and 20 or more if not using power. All the units engaged in the generation, transmission 
and distribution of electricity registered with the Central Electricity Authority are also 
covered under the ASI, irrespective of their employment size. It does not include the 
service sector. However, certain services and activities like cold storage, water supply 
and repair services are covered under the survey.  
 
The ASI data are widely used in the context of analysis of the Indian industrial sector 
(see, e.g., Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy, 2003; Besley and Burgess, 2004; Aghion, 
Burgess and Zilibotti, 2004; Aghion et al., 2005; Lall and Chakravorty, 2005). The 
problem with ASI data lies with the construction of the annual samples. ASI classifies 
industrial units into the “census” sector and the “sample” sector. While the factories 
employing 100 or more workers constitute the census sector, the remaining factories 
constitute the sample sector. Each year, ASI collects and reports data for all units in the 
census sector, but only one in three units in the sample sector. In other words, for any 
industry, the difference in the number of plants between years t and t+1 does not 
                                                 
10  These states are as follows: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh 
and West Bengal.  
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directly provide a measure of net entry. However, the use of plant level data for 
discussion of creative destruction is deemed acceptable (e.g., Bartelsman, Haltiwanger 
and Scarpetta, 2004). Further, as we demonstrate in the Appendix, under reasonable 
assumptions, it yields a monotonic transformation of the true measure of net entry. We, 
therefore, use the ASI data to measure net entry in the context of our analysis. 
 
For each 3-digit industry, the net entry for the 1984-91 period is defined as the number 
of plants in 1991 less the number of plants in 1984. Net entry for the 1992-97 period is 
similarly defined. 
 
5.2 Explanatory variables 
The industry-level variables that explain variations in net entry across industry and 
regions, and each of which have been obtained from ASI data, have been measured as 
follows: 
 
Number of incumbent plants: For each 3-digit industry, use the number of industrial 
units in 1984 and 1992, respectively, as the initial values of the number of plants for the 
1984-91 and 1992-97 periods.  
 
Growth of the industry: We measure growth of each industry as the percentage change 
in the aggregate real (net) value added by all plants in the industry. Since net entry over 
a period of time would almost certainly be affected by industry-level growth of all the 
years in this time period, we use as the explanatory variable the average of the annual 
growth rates of real (net) value added for all the years within each of the two time 
periods.  
 
Technology: An ideal way of measuring technology would be the vintage of the 
machinery and equipment used by the industrial units. However, such detailed data are 
not available. Following Tybout (1997), we, therefore, used the capital-labor ratio, 
defined as the (real) value of fixed capital divided by the number of workers, as a proxy 
for technology. The underlying logic is that technology is approximately measurable by  
  20
the mix of capital and labour.
11 As in the case of industry growth, we use for our 
analysis, the average of the capital-labor ratio, for each 3-digit industry, across each of 
the time periods. 
 
Industry concentration: Industry concentration has been measured as the proportion of 
total sales coming from the 4 largest industrial units in each of the 3-digit industries. 
Since the largest units are in the census sector of the survey, each round reports the sales 
of these units. Hence, our data does not suffer from any informational bias. The problem 
once again is that the sales data corresponds to plants and not firms, and hence our 
measure is not a 4-firm concentration ratio in the conventional sense. But, on account of 
data limitations, we continue to use this measure of industry competitiveness. 
 
The state-level variables were collected from various sources. As in the case of the 
industry-level variables, for most of the state-level variables, we have used for our 
analysis the average values across all the years for each of the two time periods. The 
variables are as follows: 
 
Economic growth: The state GDP figures are taken from the archives of the Economic 
and Political Weekly (EPW) Research Foundation.  
 
Nature of democracy: As we have discussed earlier in this paper, democracy refers to 
the accountability of a government to the electorate. In the Indian context, given the 
continuing widespread poverty, we feel that accountability is best measured by the 
fiscal allocation of a government to public goods that directly affect the welfare of the 
vast majority of the electorate (e.g., Pourgerami, 1988; Stasavage, 2005). We, therefore, 
choose a state government’s per capita expenditure on health as the measure for its 
accountability to the people of that state.
12 The data on state-level budgetary allocation 
and state-level population have also been obtained from the EPW Research Foundation. 
 
                                                 
11 Note that this measure of technology also encompasses a measure of the capital required by a 
new entrant, on average, to successfully enter the market. Hence, if the coefficient of this 
variable is significant, it would require a careful interpretation. 
12  We have verified that per capita expenditure on health and per capita income are not 
systematically correlated at the state level, neither across states for a given year, nor across 
years for a given state. Hence, our measure of democracy is not collinear with, nor a proxy for, 
the extent of prosperity of a state.  
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In addition, for each of the 1984-91 and 1992-97 periods, we construct the proportion of 
years during which a regional party was in power. The data on election results required 
to construct this variable were obtained from the Election Commission of India. 
 
Labor: The ideal measure for high-skilled labor is the proportion of labor force with 
tertiary and/or technical education. However, such detailed data are not available for the 
states, and construction of this data from Census information is costly. We, therefore, 
assume that there is a high correlation of the number and/or proportion of people in 
different educational/skill cohorts, such that a crude measure like the literacy rate would 
capture the level of skill of the population or labor force at the state level. The data on 
literacy rate were taken from various issues of Selected Educational Statistics of the 
Department of Secondary and Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource 
Development. 
 
Following Besley and Burgess (2004), we use as our measure of state-level labor policy 
the number of man-days lost on account of industrial action. This data were collected 
from various editions of the Indian Labour Year Handbook. We have normalized this 
data using the total number of employees in the manufacturing sector of each state. The 
data on the number of employees were obtained from ASI.  
 
Legacy: As explained earlier, we have to control for the initial level of industrialization 
of a state. For each state, we do so by using the share of the manufacturing sector in the 
state GDP in 1984 and 1991, respectively, for the 1984-91 and 1992-97 periods. The 
break down for the GDP of each state was obtained from the EPW Research 
Foundation. 
 
Finally, we use two measures of governance, one of which, namely, state-level human 
development indices, captures accountability, growth, human capital of the people, etc, 
in one unified measure, we use state-level human development indices. The data for this 
index were taken from various issues of Health Information of India published by the 
Central Bureau of Health Intelligence, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The 
alternative measure of governance used in our analysis is state-level technical and 
distribution (T&D) losses that embody accountability of the government as well as the  
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state of infrastructure. The data for T&D loss were obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund. 
 
5.3 An initial look at entry rates 
While our analysis is restricted to the 1984-97 period, we report in Figures 1 and 2 
trends in net entry rates for the 1980-97 period, in part to present a longer term view, 
and in part to justify the exclusion of the 1980-84 period from the sample. Before 
examining the data, however, it is important to identify a specific political event that 
occurred during the early eighties. In January of 1982, India witnessed the initiation of a 
massive industrial action in the textile industry. This industrial action continued for 18 
months, and spilled over into other industries. It came to an end after the central 
government took over the management of 13 textile units in October 1983. The long 
strike in India’s (then) largest industry created a severe disruption in investment and the 
1982-83 net entry rate was a staggering negative 11 per cent (Figure 1), the lowest for 
any year since 1975-76. During the eighties, 1986-87 was the only other year where the 
net entry rate was negative (minus 3 per cent).  
 
Figure 1 
Variations in net entry rates over time 
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In the first 5 years of the 1980s, the average net entry rate was 0.55, and in the next 5 
years it was 2.29, giving us an average rate of 1.42 for the decade. In the 1990s, the first 
half witnessed a higher net entry rate (2.68). From the summary statistics, therefore, 
there is not much that distinguishes second half of the 1980s from the first half of the 
1990s. The statistics merely reflect the fact that the business/policy environment was 
more conducive for entry in the second half of the eighties than in the first half, and this 
can largely be explained by the industrial action and the political events highlighted 
above. 
 
Figure 2 
Variations in net entry rates across states 
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However, this aggregate data does not reveal the role of state governments and 
institutions (i.e., economic federalism) in influencing the variation of net entry rates 
across the states. To recapitulate, prior to the nineties, the focus of the centrally 
controlled industrial policy was on reducing regional disparities. The liberalization 
policies of the nineties resulted in greater economic federalism and states had the 
opportunity to influence both the geographical location and the subsequent performance 
of industrial units by way of differences in the nature of implementation of regulations 
and the quality of governance, in general, across states. Earlier, location of industrial 
units was not based on optimal decisions on the part of the firms. But, in the nineties,  
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industrial units were increasingly located in states that were industry friendly and had a 
better investment climate (Figure 2).
13 It is immediately evident that in most states the 
net entry rate in the nineties has been considerably higher than in the eighties, and that a 
drop in average entry rates are concentrated among four states: Uttar Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. With the exception of Andhra Pradesh, all these 
states are known for their poor governance levels, and low levels of economic 
prosperity. In other words, there is prima facie evidence to suggest that, in keeping with 
our empirical specification, state-level factors may indeed have affected inter-industry 
and inter-state variations in entry rates during the post-1991 period in India. 
 
6. Empirical strategy and regression results 
Much of the empirical analysis about entry involves the use of pooled cross-section time 
series data. Tybout’s (1997) specification included industry level variables as well as 
dummy variable controls for unobserved industry characteristics and the years for which 
data were available for his analysis. He used ordinary least squares (OLS) with 
appropriate corrections for heteroskedasticity to estimate his model. Klapper et al. 
(2005), on the other hand, adapt the empirical strategy proposed by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), using the United States of America as the benchmark country, and estimate their 
model for entry using OLS as well. 
 
Our empirical strategy deviates from those of both Tybout (1997) and Klapper et al. 
(2005). The latter methodology helps address a question of the following type: if 
Gujarat is the state where the business environment (or institutions) is most favorable 
for entry among Indian states, what are the factors that reduce entry rates in other Indian 
states vis-à-vis Gujarat? While we are interested in the impact of state level variables on 
entry rates, this is not the specific question that we are attempting to address. Our 
reservation about Tybout’s methodology stems from the fact that any industry level and, 
especially, state level condition prevailing in year t is unlikely to explain entry rates in 
period t itself. In particular, variables that capture the nature of political institutions and 
resource allocation at the state level are likely to long term affect entry as opposed to 
contemporaneous entry rates. 
 
                                                 
13 The states considered here account for more than 95 per cent of all industrial units and the 
total population.  
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We, therefore, adopt the following strategy: We use as our dependent variable the 
change in the number of plants belonging to industry i in state j over the 1984-91 and 
1992-97 periods, those roughly corresponding to the two reforms periods mentioned in 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2005). We then use as our explanatory variables the average 
values for the aforementioned industry-level and state-level determinants of entry rates 
for each of these periods.
14 In addition, we control for the initial number of plants 
belonging to each industry in each state. In other words, if Nij is the number of plants 
belonging to industry i in state j, our (modified) regression model is given by the 
following: 
 
    e N Z X N ij ij ij
n j
j
m i
ij i ij + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∆
= =
, 0 λ α γ β    [2] 
 
The regression estimates for the 1984-91 and 1992-97 periods are reported in Tables 1 
and 2, respectively. Starting with roughly the Tybout (1997) specification in column 1, 
we introduce in column 2 controls for unobserved 2-digit industry level factors that 
might affect entry rates. In column 3, we add to the specification the human 
development index that subsumes state level measures of both growth and development, 
and hence all the measures of resource endowments, institutions and governance. In a 
sense, the introduction of the index into the specification is similar to controlling for 
state level factors using dummy variables. In addition, we control for the proportion of 
years during each period in which a regional party was in power at the state, and the 
number of man-days lost on account of industrial strife, per industrial laborer. In 
column 4, we use the alternative measure of accountability, namely, T&D loss, instead 
of the human development index. Following Bhaumik and Estrin (forthcoming), in 
column 5, we unpack these measures of accountability and, mindful of the collinearity 
among state level factors that might affect entry rates, we introduce instead variables 
that proxy the possible determinants of entry, as discussed earlier in this paper. The F-
                                                 
14 Note that the use of averaging values across time to capture long term relationships between 
variables is not uncommon, especially in the growth and financial economic literature (e.g., 
Barro, 1991; Chirinko and Elston, 2006). As pointed out by Pesaran and Smith (1995), the 
resultant estimates are consistent if the time span over which the averaging is done is long. In 
our case, the averaging is being done over six to eight years.  By comparison, an average post- 
World War II business cycle in the United States of America has lasted about five years peak-
to-peak, including about 45 months of expansion and about 11 months of recession.  
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statistics suggest that our specifications are statistically meaningful, and the coefficient 
estimates are largely robust across the specifications. 
 
Table 1 
Determinants of net entry (1984-91) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 
 
- 28.72 ** 
  (14.33) 
- 28.32 ** 
  (14.55) 
- 38.47 * 
  (21.82) 
- 51.33 * 
  (28.66) 
- 76.11 
  (48.67) 
Initial number of plants 
 
  0.34 
  (0.24) 
  0.34 
  (0.24) 
  0.35 
  (0.24) 
  0.34 
  (0.24) 
  0.35 
  (0.25) 
Growth of value added 
 
  3.54 ** 
  (1.45) 
  3.15 ** 
  (1.63) 
  3.37 ** 
  (1.76) 
  3.15 ** 
  (1.63) 
  3.37 ** 
  (1.76) 
Capital-to-labour ratio 
 
  2.49 
  (2.79) 
  1.77 
  (3.10) 
  1.95 
  (3.24) 
  1.77 
  (3.07) 
  2.01 
  (3.20) 
4-plant concentration ratio 
 
  0.08 
  (0.23) 
  0.12 
  (0.23) 
  0.13 
  (0.25) 
  0.12 
  (0.24) 
  0.13 
  (0.25) 
Industry controls    No    Yes ***    Yes ***    Yes ***    Yes *** 
Human development index 
    
- 18.91 
  (23.01)     
T&D loss 
      
  0.53 
  (0.90)   
Man days lost because of 
industrial action (per 
worker)    
  58.84 * 
  (35.91) 
  55.98 * 
  (33.71) 
  59.37 * 
  (34.43) 
Literacy rate (percentage) 
      
- 0.09 
  (0.14) 
Per capita total expenditure 
on  health      
- 0.09 
  (0.14) 
Manufacturing as 
percentage of state GDP         
  53.58 
  (44.71) 
Growth of state GDP 
      
  3.43 
  (2.84) 
Proportion of years 
governed by regional party     
  6.04 
  (4.46) 
  4.78 
  (5.77) 
- 1.96 
  (10.90) 
       
F-statistics 
Prob > F-statistics 
  8.91 
  (0.00) 
  5.42 
  (0.00) 
  4.40 
  (0.00) 
  4.60 
  (0.00) 
  3.75 
  (0.00) 
Adjusted R-square    0.191    0.187    0.195    0.194    0.196 
Nobs    1650    1650    1540    1650    1540 
Note:  The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. 
  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of net entry (1992-97) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 
 
- 2.77  
  (11.41) 
- 1.37 
  (13.13) 
- 16.94 
  (16.98) 
  3.78 
  (16.02) 
- 25.89 * 
  (15.28) 
Initial number of plants 
 
  0.04 
  (0.07) 
  0.04 
  (0.07) 
  0.04 
  (0.07) 
  0.04 
  (0.43 
  0.04 
  (0.07) 
Growth of value added 
 
  0.74 ** 
  (0.36) 
  1.03 ** 
  (0.44) 
  1.02 ** 
  (0.46) 
  1.03 ** 
  (0.43) 
  1.03 ** 
  (0.44) 
Capital-to-labour ratio 
 
  3.84 * 
  (2.12) 
  3.44 
  (2.57) 
  3.66 
  (2.74) 
  3.43 
  (2.57) 
  3.41 
  (2.56) 
4-plant concentration ratio 
 
- 0.19 ** 
  (0.09) 
- 0.27 *** 
  (0.10) 
- 0.28 *** 
  (0.11) 
- 0.27 *** 
  (0.10) 
- 0.27 *** 
  (0.10) 
Industry controls    No    Yes *    Yes *    Yes *    Yes * 
Human development index 
    
  33.76 * 
  (18.99)     
T&D loss 
      
- 0.31 * 
  (0.18)   
Man days lost because of 
industrial action (per 
worker)    
  11.61 
  (33.20) 
 
  23.99 
  (29.95) 
 
  3.61 
  (34.43) 
 
Literacy rate (percentage) 
    
 
  
  0.43 ** 
  (0.17) 
Per capita total expenditure 
on  health      
- 19.53 ** 
  (8.27) 
Manufacturing as 
percentage of state GDP         
  48.23 ** 
  (18.82) 
Growth of state GDP 
      
  0.13 
  (0.18) 
Proportion of years 
governed by regional party     
- 1.93 
  (5.29) 
- 1.86 
  (5.21) 
- 3.62 
  (5.62) 
       
F-statistics 
Prob > F-statistics 
  5.67 
  (0.00) 
  2.41 
  (0.00) 
  2.73 
  (0.00) 
  2.55 
  (0.00) 
  2.75 
  (0.00) 
Adjusted R-square    0.032    0.037    0.039    0.037    0.041 
Nobs    1560    1560    1456    1560    1560 
Note:  The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. 
  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The coefficient estimates reported in Table 1 indicate that, during the 1984-91 period, 
entry was driven very significantly by industry level growth, and unobserved industry-
level factors. The state level factors played a relatively small role in explaining entry, 
and, as highlighted by the counterintuitive positive sign of the industrial strife variable, 
the state level variables do not necessarily provide an adequate explanation of the 
pattern of entry across industries and states. 
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The results reported in Table 2 suggest that industry level growth continued to have a 
positive impact on entry during the 1992-97 period. However, entrepreneurs were 
clearly thinking more strategically in the post-1991 period of competition than in the 
pre-1991 period that was arguably pro-incumbent (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005). 
This is evident from the negative impact of industry concentration on entry, one that 
was not observed during the 1984-91 period. To recapitulate, firms belonging to 
concentrated industries adopt various strategies to reduce the likelihood of entry, 
including influencing the creation and enforcement of government regulations in a way 
that raises the entry barriers facing potential entrants (Chari and Gupta, 2005). 
 
At the same time, state level factors played a significantly greater part in the post-1991 
period than in the pre-1991 period, a result that is consistent with the conclusions drawn 
by Kochhar et al. (forthcoming) and Aghion et al. (2005). To begin with, net entry was 
positively correlated with state-level human development index, and negatively 
correlated with T&D losses. This indicates that net entry is during the 1990s was higher 
in states where governments were reforms minded, and thereby mindful of T&D losses, 
and, at the same time, adopted policies that enhanced the human capital of the residents 
of those states. The more detailed analysis reported in column 5 of the table suggests 
that entry during the 1992-97 period was significantly influenced by the state level 
literacy rates, a proxy for educational attainments of the state residents. This is 
consistent with the stylized fact that India’s industrialization during the post-1991 
period has been driven significantly by industries like pharmaceuticals and auto 
ancillaries that require skilled labor, rather than by low skilled mass manufacturing 
industries. Not surprisingly, states with high levels of industrialization, as captured by 
the contribution of the manufacturing to state GDP, attracted more firms than states 
where the initial level of industrialization was low.
15 
 
Surprisingly, however, our measure of a state-level democracy, namely, per capita 
expenditure on health, had a negative impact on entry. As such, this is inconsistent with 
the findings of Djankov et al. (2002). But, at a closer look, the difference between our 
result and those of Djankov et al. lies in the fact that “democracy” for us implies 
accountability of the government to the all the stakeholders, while to Djankov et al. it 
                                                 
15 For example, the average entry rate increased substantially for Maharashtra (from 0.56 to 
2.31) and Gujarat (from 0.40 to 2.35), two states that were highly industrialized prior to 1991.  
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was a measure of the ability of the incumbent firms to influence the government to erect 
regulatory and procedural barriers to entry. The continued electoral success of the 
communist parties in states like Kerala and West Bengal, where the governments have 
traditionally been pro-rural development, and the recent electoral loss of the Telegu 
Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh, the emerging hub of high technology industry, 
suggests that political accountability in a functioning democracy with a large poverty 
ridden population may not be consistent with phenomena like entry that are desirable 
from the point of view of market development. Indeed, if rapid industrial growth in a 
largely agrarian society increases overall income inequality among the voting 
population, the stability of the political regime is threatened (Muller, 1988), thereby 
bringing to a stop economic reforms that might be beneficial for industrial growth but 
ones that adversely affect the income distribution. 
 
In order to further explore the growing importance state level factors in determining 
patterns of entry and, therefore, industrialization, in post-1991 India, we undertook the 
following exercise: We regressed the change in the number of plants during the 1984-91 
and 1992-97 periods, our dependent variables for the estimates reported in Tables 1 and 
2, on the initial number of plants for each industry in each state, and on 3-digit industry 
dummy variables and state dummy variables. For the 1984-91 period, the adjusted R-
square value for the resultant regression model was 0.19, comparable with the adjusted 
R-square values reported in Table 1. For the 1992-97 period, however, the adjusted R-
square value yielded by this exercise was 0.14, much higher than the adjusted R-square 
values of (about) 0.05 reported in Table 2. Experimentation with the specification 
suggested that much of this additional predictive power is on account of the state 
dummy variables. While adjusted R-square models are not strictly comparable across 
non-nested regression models with different sample size, this provides with a 
reasonably strong evidence that unobserved state level factors that we have not 
accounted for in our regression models had a strong influence on entry during the post-
1991 era of economic federalism. The plausible classification of these unobserved 
factors can be made under the header “institutions and governance.”  
 
Finally, we undertook two different robustness checks. First, we took into account the 
possibility that while state-level factors reflect long-term steady states that are not 
significantly affected by policy changes and entry and exit of firms in the short run, the  
  30
industry level variables are not immune to entry and policy changes, and that, therefore, 
using period averages of industry level variables on the right hand side of equation [2] 
might give rise to endogeneity. Hence, we re-estimated the models using the initial (i.e., 
1984 and 1992 for Tables 2 and 3, respectively) values of the industry level variables, 
instead of using their period averages. Second, we took into consideration that 
possibility that the impact of industry level and state level variables on net entry may be 
different for high technology and low technology industries. We, therefore, re-estimated 
our regression models separately for low technology and medium-to-high technology 
industries, using the classification for technological intensity of the OECD. The new 
coefficient estimates, which are not reported in the paper, indicate that our results are 
robust to these exercises. 
 
7. Impact on productivity 
The traditional methodology for estimation of tfp involved estimation of a production 
function, usually with value added as the dependent variable and labor and capital as the 
explanatory variables, and treating the residuals of the regression model as tfp. Olley 
and Pakes (1996) demonstrated that this traditional methodology suffers from a 
shortcoming, namely, it does not account for the possible endogeneity of capital, and 
suggested a now stylized way to correct for the associated bias. Using information on 
gross value added, capital stock and labor cost at the 3-digit industry level, and the 
Olley-Pakes algorithm, we estimate 3-digit industry level for the Indian manufacturing 
industries for the 1984-97 period.  
 
Specifically, we separately estimate the following model for the 1984-91 and 1992-97 
periods: 
 
    u K L V i i i i + + = ln ln ln β α      [3] 
 
when V is the value added, L is the labor cost, K is the capital stock, and i is the index 
for 3-digit industries. The Olley-Pakes algorithm is used to estimate unbiased values for 
α and β. The unbiased estimates for α and β, respectively, were 0.5272 and 0.3646 for 
the 1984-92 period, and 0.5232 and 0.3637 for the 1992-97 period. In other words, the 
marginal productivity of labor and capital were largely unchanged during the pre- and  
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post-1991 periods. The residual ui for an industry i in period t then is the measure of tfp 
for that industry in that time period.  
 
Figure 3 
Changes in total factor productivity over time 
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The distributions of tfp across the 3-digit industries, for 1984, 1991 and 1997 are 
highlighted in Figure 3. Two things are immediately evident from these distributions. 
First, there has been an increase in tfp of manufacturing industries, on average, over 
time. Further, the gain in tfp between 1991 and 1997 is much more noticeable than the 
gain in tfp between 1984 and 1991. Second, the distribution for 1997 is thicker and 
flatter, indicating a wider dispersion of tfp across 3-digit industries during the 1990s. 
These findings are consistent with those of Aghion et al. (2005) and Ramaswamy 
(1999). 
 
Next, in an attempt to link (net) entry rates with changes in tfp, we regress tfp growth 
on net entry rates, the units of our analysis being 3-digit industries. Note that we have 
measures of tfp and net entry rates for 3-digit industries for all years for the 1984-97  
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period. Further, while the impact of industry-level and state-level variables on (net) 
entry can be meaningfully discussed only in the context of the long run, the impact of 
(net) entry on tfp growth can be immediate. This can happen by way of entry of firms 
that are, on average, more productive than the incumbents, and, correspondingly, by exit 
of firms that are, on average, less productive than the incumbents who do not exit. Also, 
competition ensuing from entry can lead to technological upgradation and other forms 
of productivity-augmenting restructuring within a relatively short period of time. Hence, 
we make use of the entire panel to establish a link between tfp growth and net entry 
rates. 
 
We argue that the appropriate econometric model is given by the following 
specification: 
 
    ε δ γ
it i it it it v D NER TG + + Φ + + =        [4] 
 
where TG is tfp growth, NER is net entry rate, D is a vector of control variables, ν is a 
3-digit industry fixed effect, and ε is the random error. Since most of the industry-level 
and state-level characteristics are subsumed in the net entry rate itself, we use as 
controls two dummy variables that capture aspects of the reforms undertaken by the 
Rajiv Gandhi government (1985-89) and the Narasimha Rao government (1992-97).
16 
These dummy variables capture all aspects of reforms that may not have affected net 
entry rates but that might have an impact on tfp growth. 
 
Next, we introduce into the specification lags of net entry rates as explanatory variables. 
While the contemporaneous value of NER is expected to capture the direct effect of 
entry (and exit) on tfp growth, the lagged values of this variable are expected to capture 
                                                 
16 The intermediate period of 1989-91, the omitted category, was a period of political flux. A 
breakaway faction of the Congress Party, led by Vishwanath Pratap Singh, took office in 1989, 
with outside support from the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The VP Singh 
government introduced job reservations for “other backward castes” that led to widespread 
political demonstration around much of India, and resulted in policy paralysis. The unstable VP 
Singh government gave way to one led by Chandrashekhar that was in power for about three 
months. The political crisis and policy paralysis coincided with the first Gulf war, and the rise in 
global oil prices. The culmination of these factors was a balance of payments crisis in 1991, and 
the general election during the year brought into power a Congress government led by 
Narasimha Rao.  
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the indirect effect by way of competitive pressure on the incumbent firms. However, 
since there might be some endogeneity between NER and the reforms captured by the 
dummy variables, such that fixed effects coefficients might be inconsistent, we re-
estimate the model using generalized method of moments (GMM). 
 
Table 3 
Impact of (net) entry on TFP growth 
 
 
Fixed effects model: 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net entry rate    0.3530 *** 
  (0.0537 
  0.3577 *** 
  (0.0536) 
  0.3768 *** 
  (0.0568) 
  0.4199 *** 
  (0.6336) 
Net entry rate [-1]      - 0.1864 *** 
  (0.0555) 
- 0.1978 *** 
  (0.0604) 
Net entry rate [-2]          0.0320 
  (0.0634) 
Dummy for 1985-89    - 0.0321 
  (0.0382) 
- 0.0370 
  (0.0405) 
- 0.0491 
  (0.0440) 
Dummy for 1992-97      0.0665 * 
  (0.0384) 
  0.0703 * 
  (0.0405) 
  0.0667 
  (0.0437) 
Constant -  0.0025 
  (0.0161) 
- 0.0131 
  (0.0260) 
- 0.0124 
  (0.0279) 
- 0.0162 
  (0.0295) 
      
LR Chi-square    42.72 
  (0.00) 
  49.06 
  (0.00) 
  58.04 
  (0.00) 
  57.77 
  (0.00) 
Log likelihood  - 1819.25  - 1816.08  - 1742.12  - 1543.23 
No. of observations    1786    1786    1672    1465 
No. of groups    130    130    130    130 
 
GMM model: 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Net entry rate    0.2750 ** 
  (0.1209) 
  0.2838 ** 
  (0.1211) 
  0.1985 ** 
  (0.1028) 
  0.2780 * 
  (0.1462) 
Net entry rate [-1]      - 0.0727 
  (0.0491) 
  0.0466 
  (0.0709) 
Net entry rate [-2]          0.1563 
  (0.1316) 
Dummy for 1985-89    - 0.0378 
  (0.0264) 
- 0.0216 
  (0.0233) 
- 0.0501 
  (0.0316) 
Dummy for 1992-97      0.0627 * 
  (0.0340) 
  0.0782 ** 
  (0.0297) 
  0.0512 
  (0.0351) 
Constant -  0.0008 
  (0.0147) 
- 0.0084 
  (0.0254) 
- 0.0209 
  (0.0177) 
- 0.0048 
  (0.0206) 
      
Hansen test Chi-sq 
Prob > Chi-square 
  129.48 
  (0.47) 
  126.46 
  (0.50) 
  123.49 
  (0.52) 
  122.91 
  (0.43) 
AR(1) -  2.50  ** 
  (0.01) 
- 2.50 ** 
  (0.01) 
- 2.39 ** 
  (0.02) 
- 2.71 ** 
  (0.01) 
AR(2)     0.87 
  (0.38) 
  0.86 
  (0.39) 
  0.88 
  (0.37) 
  0.65 
  (0.51)  
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F-statistics 
Prob > F-statistics 
  5.30 ** 
  (0.02) 
  4.64 *** 
  (0.00) 
  3.66 ** 
  (0.01) 
  2.67 ** 
  (0.00) 
No. of observations    1786    1786    1675    1563 
No. of groups    130    130    130    130 
Note:  The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. 
  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The coefficient estimates from the fixed effects and GMM models are reported in Table 
3. The estimates indicate the following: (a) net entry rate is positively associated with 
tfp growth of 3-digit industries in the Indian manufacturing sector, (b) the gain in tfp is 
largely on account of the direct or instantaneous impact of entry (and exit),
17 and (c) 
while the reforms of the 1980s did not have any impact on tfp growth, the reforms of 
the 1990s had a weak positive impact on it. In other words, removal of entry barriers in 
India benefited the industries largely by way of establishment of new production units 
with better technology and more efficient production modes, and perhaps, to a much 
lesser extent, by way of exit of less efficient firms with obsolete technology. Further, 
our results are consistent with the analysis of Rodrik and Subramaium (2005): a priori 
pro-incumbent reforms of the 1980s were not expected to have any impact on tfp 
growth, while pro-competition reforms of the 1990s were expected to have a positive 
impact on tfp growth, and this is what our results bear out. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
It is now widely accepted that productivity growth is the key to competitiveness and 
growth of firms and, in the larger context, of countries. Economists have long argued 
that competition, by way of contestability of markets, is an important way to ensure that 
firms experience productivity growth. However, in the early years of this discussion, 
much of the attention was focussed on the strategic interaction between potential 
entrants and incumbents who wanted to deter entry. More recently, there has been 
growing realization among economists that, especially in the context of developing 
countries, institutional and regulatory factors might play a bigger role in ensuring or 
deterring contestability than strategic factors per se. Our paper is an attempt to 
contribute to that growing literature, drawing on the experience of 3-digit manufacturing 
industries in India.  
                                                 
17 Indeed, if at all, the lagged or indirect impact of net entry rate on tfp growth is negative. A 
plausible explanation for this is that competition reduces the rent that incumbent firms earn, and 
this, in turn, reduces their ability to upgrade technology which, in the context of inflexible labor 
laws, is often the best (or even only) way to improve tfp.  
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On account of data deficiency, our results have to be treated with caution. It can, for 
example, be argued that our measure of (net) entry de facto captures net capital formation in 
India’s manufacturing sector, and that, therefore, the observed relationship between “entry” 
and tfp growth may reflect the embodied technological change associated with the capital 
formation. However, as we have discussed earlier in this paper, in the context of a 
developing country, one has to take a broader view of the processes of entry and exit. To 
that extent, we report strong prima facie evidence to suggest that the following can be said 
about the impact of reforms process in India, as it relates to entry and productivity: First, 
while net entry during the 1980s was affected mostly by observed and unobserved industry-
level factors, during the 1990s, variations in net entry rate are much more closely correlated 
to state-level factors. In particular, unobserved state-level factors, which we may term 
“quality of governance”, explain much of these variations during the 1992-97 period. This 
result is consistent with the results reported by Besley and Burgess (2004) and Kochhar et 
al. (forthcoming). Second, there was an increase in tfp over the years, but most noticeably 
between 1991 and 1997. At the same time, however, the distribution of tfp was much more 
unequal during the 1992-97 period than in the 1984-91 period. This is consistent with the 
findings of Aghion et al. (2005). Third, net entry during the 1985-91 period was positively 
associated with tfp growth, and much of the impact was direct or instantaneous, i.e., arising 
from entry of firms that are more productive, on average, than the incumbents (and perhaps 
exit of firms that are the least productive among the incumbents).  Finally, tfp growth was 
not affected by the reforms of the 1980s, but was positively affected by the reforms of the 
1990s. This is consistent with the analysis of Rodrik and Subramanian (2005). 
 
Our analysis raises more questions than it answers. As such, by being restricted to the level 
of 3-digit industries, our analysis does not capture in the best possible way the nuances of 
what is essentially a firm-level phenomenon. Specifically, given our inability to identify 
new entrants and firms exiting the product market, we are unable to examine the dynamics 
of entry, survival and exit in the manner in which Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001) were able 
to examine such patterns in the context of Taiwan. We also cannot identify whether the 
increase in tfp can be attributed more to entry of foreign firms, or to entry of de novo 
domestic firms, or to improvement in productivity of incumbent domestic firms in the face 
of growing competition. These deficiencies can be addressed in future research with the use 
of appropriate data whose collection, it is hoped, will, at least in part, be stimulated by our 
study.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Let the following be true: 
 
Bt  =   number of large firms in period t that are included in the census sector of  
ASI data 
St  =  number of small and medium firms in period t that are included in the  
sample sector of ASI data 
a  =  number of new large firms entering the product market 
b  =  number of incumbent large firms exiting the product market 
c  =  number of small and medium firms growing in size and becoming part of  
the census sector 
d  =  number of large firms that reduce in size and become part of the sample  
sector 
e  =   number of new small and medium firms entering the product market 
f  =  number of incumbent small and medium firms exiting the product  
market 
 
Suppose that all large firms are captured in a survey, while only one in three small and 
medium firms are reported. In other words, data reported for two successive surveys 
provide us with the following information: 
 
() () ) (
3
2
) (
3
1
) (
3
1
1 1 d c f e b a A S S B B t t t t − + − + − = − + − ≡
+ +      [A1] 
 
It is easily seen that, in the absence of the possibility to move from the census sector to 
the sample sector, and vice versa, the following is true: 
 
() () ) (
3
1
) (
1 1 f e b a B S S B B t t t t − + − = − + − ≡
+ +       [ A 2 ]  
 
which is a monotonic transformation of the actual net entry that is given by {(a-b)+(e-
f)}. 
 
It is also easily seen that A would be a monotonic transformation of B, and therefore of 
the actual net entry, if the following were true: c > d. Since small and medium firms are 
much more likely to grow into larger firms, while poorly performing larger firms are 
more likely to exit than to exist with a much diminished presence, and given that there 
are many more small and medium firms relative to large firms, it would be reasonable 
to assume that indeed c > d.  
 
Hence, our measure of net entry, which is captured by A, is a monotonic transformation 
of the actual measure of net entry. 
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